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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 1997, the United'States Supreme Court heard oral
argument' in two cases that could prove to have as much resounding
impact on American life as the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.2 Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg3 and Vacco v. Quill4 present the Court with the
question whether the Constitution affords a mentally competent, termi-
nally ill adult the right to commit physician-assisted suicide. 5
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide6 contend that an individual
1. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter Oral Argument in Glucksberg];
Official Transcript Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of the United States, Vacco v. Quill,
80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858) [hereinafter Oral
Argument in Quill ].
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117
S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110).
4. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858).
5. The Court is actually confronted with two constitutional questions. First, it has been
asked to decide whether there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in assisted suicide
under the Due Process Clause. Second, it must determine whether state laws allowing patients to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment but prohibiting assisted suicide violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37
(1996) (No. 96-110); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858).
6. The proponents are represented, in both Glucksberg and Quill, by physicians and their
now deceased patients who wished to commit physician-assisted suicide. They are joined by over
thirty amici, including the American Civil Liberties Union. See Respondents' Brief at 2,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief in Glucksberg];
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has a fundamental liberty interest in choosing the "timing and manner of
one's death."7 As such, the right is protected by the Due Process
Clause. Further, they argue that there is no rational basis for a state to
distinguish between the status of terminally ill patients on life support,
to which states give the choice of refusing life-sustaining treatment, and
terminally ill patients not on life support who wish to procure the serv-
ices of a physician to commit suicide.8 Proponents are asking the court
to strike down state laws criminalizing assisted suicide, and to allow
states to regulate physician-assisted suicide as they do the right to refuse
medical treatment. 9
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide' ° argue that the Constitu-
tion cannot recognize a right to commit suicide, much less a right to
have another person aid in that suicide." Further, they argue that an
inherent difference exists between refusing medical treatment and
requesting lethal medication.' 2 Opponents have asked the Court to
uphold state laws banning assisted suicide as not violative of substantive
due process and as rationally related to legitimate state interests.' 3
Jumping into the fray as amicus curiae, the United States has taken
yet a third approach.' 4 The United States maintains that while the Due
Respondents' Brief at 5, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996)
(No. 95-1858) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief in Quill].
7. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d at 793; Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d at 719; see also
Respondents' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 6, at i (stating that the right at issue is the right to
"bring about impending death in a certain, humane, and dignified manner"); Respondents' Brief in
Quill, supra note 6, at 24, (stating that the right at issue is "[tihe right not to be forced to die in
unendurable suffering and agony").
8. See Respondents' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 6, at 22-23; Respondents' Brief in
Quill, supra note 6, at 44-48.
9. See Respondents' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 6, at 28-30; Respondents' Brief in
Quill, supra note 6, at 33-35.
10. The States of New York and Washington, through their respective Attorneys General,
represent the opponents of physician-assisted suicide in both Glucksberg and Quill. They are
joined by over thirty amici, including the American Medical Association. See Brief for the
Petitioners at 3, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter Petitioners'
Brief in Glucksberg]; Brief for Petitioners Vacco and Pataki at 3, n.4, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief in
Quill].
11. See Petitioners' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 10, at i; Petitioners' Brief in Quill, supra
note 10, at i.
12. See Petitioners' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 10, at 10; Petitioners' Brief in Quill,
supra note 10, at 9.
13. See Petitioners' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 10, at 38; Petitioners' Brief in Quill,
supra note 10, at 27.
14. The United States is one of the country's largest health care providers, providing services
to millions of Americans through the Department of Veterans Affairs, the military, Indian Health
Services and the National Institutes of Health. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 1, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
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Process Clause includes the right to "obtain relief from severe pain or
suffering,"15 the states' interests are so significant that resolution of the
issue should be left with them. 16 Therefore, the United States argues,
those legislatures that have done so are justified to impose an outright
ban on physician-assisted suicide.
1 7
Now that the briefs have been written and the arguments made, a
final decision rests with the Supreme Court. The Court has a number of
options. It can uphold outright prohibitions on physician-assisted sui-
cide, by finding no such liberty interest in the Due Process Clause and
recognizing the inherent difference between a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment and a patient's desire to have a physician assist his
suicide. Alternatively, the Court can strike down all prohibitions on
assisted suicide, by finding that there is such a right and that no signifi-
cant difference exists between refusing life sustaining treatment and
seeking death by lethal medication. Finally, the Court can allow states
to regulate the practice, by finding that legitimate state interests compel
such regulation, regardless of whether any right to commit suicide exists
under the constitution.'
8
nom. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter United
States Brief in Glucksberg]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 2, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-
1858)[hereinafter United States Brief in Quill].
15. United States Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 14, at 12.
16. See United States Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 14, at 16; United States Brief in Quill,
supra note 14, at 8.
17. As the Court acknowledged at oral argument, finding a Due Process liberty interest in
physician-assisted suicide requires that bans on the practice be struck down. Upholding both the
right and the prohibitions would be contradictory. See Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note
1, at 14-16 (the Court noting that "if we assume a liberty interest but nonetheless say that, even
assuming a liberty interest, a state can prohibit it entirely, that would be rather a conundrum").
The United States is able to make the argument for a liberty interest and ban by redefining the
right at stake as "a right to relief from pain and suffering," and not as a "liberty interest in dying."
United States Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 14, at 12. Indeed, each of the groups-the states,
physicians, and the United States-has offered a different formulation of the right at stake. The
physicians claim that the right is "to determine the timing and manner of one's death" or more
broadly, "to hasten one's own death." See supra text accompanying note 7. The states claim that
the right is to "commit suicide." See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Constitutional
analysis under the Due Process Clause begins with a careful exposition of the right at stake. See
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). Thus, each group appreciates the importance of
defining the right. See generally Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1; Oral Argument in
Quill, supra note 1 (asking every party to attempt to define the right at stake).
18. Yet a fourth approach has been offered by at least one amicus curiae, which has asked the
Court to reverse the lower courts by finding that the question is not ripe for constitutional
adjudication. The theory relies on Justice Brandeis' classic admonition that the Court should not
prematurely decide "novel, complex social problems," but rather should allow "deliberation and
experimentation in ...[the] laboratory of the states." See Brief of the Project on Death in
America, Open Society Institute, as Amicus Curiae, for Reversal of the Judgments Below at 3,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) and Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert.
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This Article explores the high price of any decision in Glucksberg
and Quill.'9 Part II explores potential consequences of continued socie-
tal and legal prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide. First, as propo-
nents suggest, the "winks and nods" practice of covert and unregulated
physician-assisted suicide may continue.20 Second, and conversely, a
continued ban will force American medicine to focus on improving end-
of-life health care.2' In doing so, patients' reasons for choosing physi-
cian-assisted suicide may disappear. Part III explores the opportunities
for profiteering under a regime of legalized assisted suicide. Normaliz-
ing suicide as a reasonable medical treatment alternative will have dev-
astating effects in a nation where health care choices are already
dwindling. This section will identify potential opportunists in the insur-
ance industry who have only recently discovered a lucrative new market
in the terminally ill. This section will also identify those most likely to
be victimized by legalized assisted suicide-the medically disen-
franchised poor, elderly, minorities and disabled. Part IV explores the
possibilities for state regulated physician-assisted suicide. It evaluates
some of the proposed safeguards and concludes that those safeguards are
granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Finally, one last approach, contained in Judge Calabresi's lower court concurrence in Quill v.
Vacco, remains open to the Court. 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996)
(No. 95-1858). Judge Calabresi advocated a "constitutional remand," or legislative due process
requirement, by which the Court would require states that want to retain the ban on physician-
assisted suicide to re-enact legislation to that effect with a clear articulation of the state interests
promoted by such legislation. Id. at 739. It is doubtful that the Court will consider this option.
See Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1, at 54 (the Court stating "I thought we had specifically
disclaimed the existence of [legislative due process]?").
19. This Article will not recapitulate the passionate and well-reasoned arguments offered on
the constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide. There exists an almost overwhelming wealth of
literature on the subject. For an excellent discussion from the proponent's perspective, see
TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY (1993); LONNY SHAVELSON, A CHOSEN DEATH (1995);
Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane Option, a
Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEATTLE L. REV. 495 (1995). For excellent discussions
from the opponent's perspective, see George Annas, The "Right to Die" in America:
Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 875 (1996);
Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
735 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide]; Thomas Marzen et al., Suicide: A
Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1985).
20. Lawrence Tribe described the covert practice of assisted suicide that occurs today as
"winks and nods." See Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1, at 30; Respondents' Brief in
Glucksberg, supra note 6, at 38.
21. See generally Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter AMA Brief
in Glucksberg]; Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-
1858) [hereinafter AMA Brief in Quill].
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inadequate at best. Part V examines the danger that legal challenges to
regulation present-the very real threat of "doctrinal slippage." This
section predicts the quagmire into which the legal and medical systems
will inevitably fall in attempting to ensure that the right is not abused or
expanded. More specifically, it argues that the analysis of Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,22 together with a decision
legalizing assisted suicide, will leave no principled means of limiting the
right to the terminally ill capable of withstanding scrutiny. Voluntary
euthanasia and eventually nonvoluntary euthanasia may be constitution-
ally mandated. Finally, this Article concludes that the Court, which
must consider the foregoing in rendering its July decision,23 should ulti-
mately decide to uphold the ban on physician-assisted suicide.
While there is much empirical evidence to suggest what the poten-
tial costs of any decision will be and much reason to suggest that this
debate will continue long after the Court's July decision, what is clear at
the outset is that none of the Court's options confront the real problem-
the deplorable state of health care in the United States. As Professor
Giles Scofield has declared: "The moral issue of our day is not whether
to enable or prevent [physician-assisted suicide]. The moral issue of our
day is whether to do something about our immoral system of care, in
which treatment is dispensed according to a principle best characterized
as that of economic apartheid."24 None of the available options requires
universal or equitable access to health care as a prerequisite to recogni-
tion of any right to physician-assisted suicide. Yet, any chance of sui-
cide remaining solely part of a patient's right "to define [his] own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life,"25 surely requires nondiscriminatory health care delivery.
While no decision will end this debate, only one option, a continued ban
on physician-assisted suicide, can prevent a "cheap and easy expedient"
from becoming a perverse substitute for compassionate end-of-life care.
This moral hazard compels a decision to uphold the ban on physician-
assisted suicide.26
22. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
23. See Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 19, at 749 (1995) (stating that a court
cannot "responsibly resolve the constitutional issue . . . without considering the general
implications of the asserted right").
24. Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATrLE L.
REv. 473, 491 (1995) (footnote omitted).
25. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
26. See Tom Baker, On the Geneology of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996).
Professor Baker explains that, "moral hazard signifies the perverse consequences of well-
intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life, and it also helps to deny that refusing to share those
burdens is mean-spirited or self-interested. . . . By 'proving' that helping people has harmful
19971
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II. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS Quo
The Court's first option is to uphold state laws banning physician-
assisted suicide.27 To do so, the Court must find that no right to commit
suicide exists under the Constitution, or alternatively, regardless whether
such a right exists, that states have compelling interests that render
prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide constitutional.28 Should the
Court decide to maintain the status quo, two consequences are likely to
result. As proponents claim, physician-assisted suicide, already prac-
ticed with impunity by many health care providers, will continue. On
the other hand, opponents assert that a continued prohibition will compel
the health care system to seek legal alternatives to suicide, particularly
more widespread use of hospice care and the improvement of palliative
medicine. However, no one should discount the impact a Supreme
Court decision upholding the ban will have on health care delivery in
America. Such a decision would surely curtail the "winks and nods"
practice of covert assisted suicide and provide the impetus for better
end-of-life health care.
A. Covert Assisted Suicide
As the law stands today, assisted suicide in any form is criminal
throughout the United States. Statutes in thirty-seven states and territo-
ries specifically prohibit it.29 Case law or negligent homicide statutes in
consequences, the economics of moral hazard justify the abandonment of legal rules and social
politics that try to help the less fortunate." Id. at 239.
27. Physician-assisted suicide is a discrete act, meaning a doctor's provision of the means by
which a person can commit suicide. This is the right advocated for in Quill and Glucksberg.
Contrast that with "voluntary euthanasia," by which a doctor actually administers the lethal dose
at the request of the patient. Physician-assisted suicide is also to be distinguished from
"nonvoluntary euthanasia," where a doctor, without a patient's express consent, administers lethal
medication for the purpose of causing death.
28. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 278-79 (assuming, but
not deciding, that a person has a right to refuse medical treatment, and upholding state statute
requiring clear and convincing evidence of a patient's desire to end life-sustaining treatment). But
see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3)
(1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56(a)(2) (1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. § 782.08 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1995);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1995); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-31 (Smith-Hurd 1995);
IND. CODE_ § 35-42-1-2.5(b) (1995); IOWA CODE §§ 707A.2, 707A.3 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3406 (1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:32.12 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1995); MicH. CoMP. LAWS
§ 752.1027 (1995); MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1993); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.023(1)(2) (Vernon 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1993); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 28-307 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West
1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30, 125.15 (McKinney
1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 813 (1995); 18 PA. CONS.
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other states also punish assisted suicide.3" One state stands alone. Ore-
gon, through popular vote, has legalized physician-assisted suicide.3'
Despite these laws, proponents and opponents alike acknowledge
"widespread violation of the present legal prohibitions and a secret,
unregulated underground practice" of physician-assisted suicide.32 Fur-
ther, proponents are quick to point out that a physician has never been
successfully prosecuted in the United States for assisted suicide, as evi-
dence that Americans do not have the will to punish the act.33 From
this, proponents conclude that a continued ban on the practice will have
no impact on its use, except perhaps to send doctors further
underground
a.3
While data on current practice is limited, a Washington State Study
indicates that physician-assisted suicide does occur with some fre-
quency. 5 In the study, 1,443 doctors were asked whether they had been
STAT. § 2505 (1995); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4009 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-
37 (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1995);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2141 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1995); Wis. STAT.
§ 940.12 (1995).
New York's penal law provides, in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 120.30 (McKinney 1995). A second section provides: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when ... he intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1995).
Washington State's law provides: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when
he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060
(1988).
30. See ALA. CODE. § 13A-6-4 (1995) (negligent homicide); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-107 (1995)
(negligent homicide); see also State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961); McMahan v. State, 53
So. 89 (Ala. 1910); State v. Jones, 67 S.E. 160 (S.C. 1910); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio 146
(1872); Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816).
31. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (1995) (Death With Dignity Act). Section
127.805 of the Act allows:
[a]n adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal
disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, [to] make a
written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane
and dignified manner.
The statute was quickly enjoined one month after Oregon voters passed the initiative into law. See
Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995).
32. See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RIcH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1996).
33. The unsuccessful prosecutions of Doctor Kevorkian, now implicated in thirty-six deaths,
are cited as evidence that no jury will convict a doctor of assisted suicide. See David Margolick,
Jury Acquits Dr. Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at Al.
34. See Respondents' Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 6, at 38 (citation omitted) (stating that
patients may be forced to seek the services of "a 'back alley' provider who may be a careless,
unqualified charlatan").
35. See Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington
State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919 (1996).
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requested to assist a suicide or perform euthanasia on terminally ill
patients. 6 Of the 828 doctors responding, 218 had received such
requests.37 Forty-three doctors complied.38
These results should not imply, however, that a Supreme Court
decision upholding the ban on physician-assisted suicide will not influ-
ence physician behavior. Indeed, a significant number of responding
doctors refused patient requests for assistance precisely because they
"were worried about legal consequences. 39 Other surveys indicate that
doctors consider legality the determinant in deciding whether to engage
in the practice. For example, in a Colorado survey, fifty-nine percent of
physicians indicated that they would use lethal medicine if the practice
were legal.40 Similarly, forty-five percent of surveyed California doc-
tors would engage in physician-assisted suicide, again, if it were legal.4'
Interestingly, thirty-five percent would not do it regardless of its legal
status.42
Unnsuccessful prosecution is not a legitimate reason to strike down
prohibitions on assisted suicide, as proponents suggest.43 When con-
fronted with the issue of nonenforcement, the New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law stated that the continued prohibition "carries
intense symbolic and practical significance, and 'shores up the notion of
limits in human relationships.'"44 Indeed, a lack of adequate enforce-
ment mechanisms provides support for the contrary view that legitimat-
ing the practice could prove dangerous because legalization would only
increase its prevalence while regulation of assisted suicide could never
effectively control its practice.45
In contrast, if the Supreme Court upholds state laws banning the
practice, prosecutors may be instilled with a renewed resolve to more
36. See id. at 920.
37. See id. at 921.
38. Thirty-two doctors provided assistance in suicide. An additional eleven doctors
performed euthanasia. See id. at 922.
39. Id. Twenty-six doctors or 12% refused for this reason.
40. See Lonnie R. Bristow, M.D., Report of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical
Association, Euthanasia/Physician-Assisted Suicide: Lessons in the Dutch Experience, 10 ISSUES
IN L. & MED. 81, 83 (1994).
41. See id.
42. See id. Fifty-one doctors in the Washington survey, refused to provide assistance in
suicide or euthanasia because they felt that "[p]hysicians should never perform assisted suicide ...
[or] euthanasia." See Back, supra note 35, at 922.
43. See Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 5.
44. Id. at 6 (quoting THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN
DEATH IS Sourrr: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994)
[hereinafter NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE]). After years of study, the task force recommended
to the New York legislature that prohibitions on assisted suicide remain in place. See id.
45. See discussion infra part IV.
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vigorously seek sanctions for those who would flout the law. For doc-
tors currently ambivalent to the practice, a reaffirmed prohibition on
assisted suicide will likely provide the impetus to forego assisted suicide
as an option for treating the terminally ill.46 As one commentator has
suggested, as long as physician-assisted suicide remains illegal:
as long as physicians know that in case of a complaint they will have
to be able to justify their actions to their peers and to the legal sys-
tem, the amount of such abuse will be limited. If a doctor chooses to
break the law, he should do so with full knowledge of the seriousness
of his action.47
Full knowledge of the consequences, via a Supreme Court decision ban-
ning the practice, will have an impact on many physicians in the United
States.
Proponents also cite public opinion poll data suggesting that Amer-
icans are sympathetic to the plight of the terminally ill as evidence that
the public condones covert assisted suicide.48 Americans have been
polled extensively about their views on assisted suicide, but the question
asked belies the limited utility of the answer. If asked whether the law
should allow a person to "die with dignity" or to die in a "humane and
dignified manner," only the most callous among us would say no.4 9 Yet,
even when asked in those terms, Americans do not show anything
approaching clear support for physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act5" passed by only a slim margin of fifty-
46. See Back, supra note 35, at 919 (stating that greater understanding of physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia "might influence medical and legal responses to an issue undergoing
intense public scrutiny").
47. Herbert Hendin, M.D., Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure, 10
IssUEs IN L. & MED. 123, 167 (1994) [hereinafter Hendin, Seduced by Death].
48. See Brief of the Coalition of Hospice Professionals as Amicus Curiae for Affirmance of
the Judgments Below at 9-10 & n.4, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110) and
Vacco v. Quill. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-
1858)[hereinafter Hospice Coalition Brief] (stating that "the fact that state legislatures have not
repealed ancient statutory prohibitions against physician-assisted suicide is only the weakest kind
of contrary evidence of public will, especially where such statutes have gone unenforced for
generations").
49. See Callahan & White, supra note 32 at 20. This "kind of Orwellian doublespeak... has
been acknowledged by at least one proponent as deliberate and politically motivated." Id. What's
more, proponents of physician-assisted suicide readily admit that the language chosen for both
public opinion polls and popular legislative enactments has practically determined the outcome.
See id. Indeed, use of the terms "suicide" and "euthanasia" in the Washington state initiative
helped defeat the legislation. See id. See generally Rita L. Marker & Wesley J. Smith, The Art of
Verbal Engineering, 35 DUQ. L. Rv. 81 (1996).
50. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.995 (1995). More than one commentator has queried
whether the title to this act implies that dying a natural death is somehow undignified. While the
question may sound rhetorical, one of the feared results of laws like these is that suicide may
come to be regarded as the dignified choice, and as such a duty.
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one percent.51 Reasons cited by Americans who support assisted suicide
may have more to do with the sorry state of health care in the United
States than with the belief that suicide is a constitutional right.52 It is
entirely possible that open and frank discussion of the consequences of
legalizing physician-assisted suicide would produce popular results dif-
ferent than those seen today. Moreover, health care reform emphasizing
compassionate end-of-life care could quell the fears that today fuel sup-
port for physician-assisted suicide.
B. Legal Opportunities for Humane and Dignified Death
The present state of end-of-life health care in America explains
much of the interest in physician-assisted suicide.5 3 Greater availability
of compassionate hospice care and effective palliative medication could
dissuade many terminally ill patients from opting for suicide.5 4 Equally
likely, an opinion from the Supreme Court upholding state prohibitions
on physician-assisted suicide could provide the impetus for improving
end-of-life health care in the United States which, in turn, will make
suicide less attractive. As the American Medical Association ("AMA")
has said, "the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide provides health
care professionals with a tremendous incentive to improve and expand
the availability of palliative care. 55
Indeed, both doctors and patients may be less inclined to consider
suicide as an option if their reasons for doing so are addressed. From
the patient's perspective, the fear that "pain may become intolerable,
51. See Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 18 (citation omitted).
52. Authorities cite "technological backlash," Americans' fears of being kept alive by
machines, the medical profession's "lousy job of managing pain" and the rising costs of health
care as the main reasons for support of suicide. See Dee Lane, Americans' Interest in Suicide
Heightens, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, January 1, 1995, at B1. One has to wonder whether a
Constitution that protects life, liberty and property should be turned on its head because advances
in medical technology have outpaced our ability to figure out how to use it compassionately.
53. See id.
54. At oral argument, the states pointed out that "the fact that [many of the terminally ill] die
in pain shows the task awaiting the medical profession, but it's not a task that calls for the cheap
and easy expedient of lethal medication rather than the more expensive pain palliative." Oral
Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 26. See also Brief Amicus Curiae for the National
Hospice Organization in Support of Petitioners at 5, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-
110) and Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858)
[hereinafter National Hospice Organization Brief]. The experience of members of the National
Hospice Organization has shown that "[w]hen patients suffering from terminal illness are given
proper palliative and supportive care, the desire for assistance with suicide generally disappears."
Id.
55. AMA Brief in Quill, supra note 21, at 22. Moreover, the AMA fears that "abandoning
the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide will undermine the provision of palliative care to
those who need it." Id.
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[he] may suffer a loss of dignity and become dependent on others or...
will excessively burden [his] famil[y]" are the most frequently cited rea-
sons for requesting assisted suicide.56 From the doctor's perspective, the
decision to assist a suicide usually comes after efforts to alleviate the
patient's pain have failed.5 7 Better alternatives to death may change both
perspectives.
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide advocate two alternatives
to suicide which must be explored and made universally available to
prevent suicide from becoming an acceptable end-of-life treatment
option for the terminally ill. First, compassionate hospice care must be
made more readily available to those in need.58 The "provision of a
humane, low technology environment in which to spend their final days
can go far in alleviating patients' fears of an undignified, lonely, techno-
logically dependent death."59 A continued prohibition on physician-
assisted suicide may have a direct impact on the number and availability
of hospices in the United States.6"
Additionally, improvements in palliative medicine should alleviate
patients' fears of agonizing and dependent death. The medical profes-
sion acknowledges that "the delivery of such care is 'grossly inadequate'
today, and efforts to make such care universally available have not yet
succeeded.'61 Removing the obstacles that currently leave palliative
medicine unable to manage pain effectively, 62 by forcing the health care
56. See AMA Brief in Glucksberg, supra note 21, at 8-10; see also Back, supra note 35, at
921. Accord Hendin, Seduced by Death, supra note 47, at 128. In the Netherlands, where assisted
suicide and euthanasia are commonplace, doctors report that the fear of a "loss of dignity, pain,
the wish not to die in an 'unworthy way,' dependence on others, and weariness with living" were
patients most frequently given reasons for requesting suicide. Id.
57. See Hendin, Seduced by Death, supra note 47, at 155. Doctor's feelings of failure and
helplessness may influence the decision to assist a suicide, since the physician may gain the
"illusion of mastery over the disease and the accompanying feelings of helplessness." Id. at 129.
58. See National Hospice Organization Brief, supra note 54, at 17-18; see also Hendin,
Seduced by Death, supra note 47, at 167 (stating that "[h]ospice care [in the United States] is in its
infancy").
59. John Glasson, M.D., Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 91, 95
(1994).
60. As the Court noted at oral argument, the Netherlands has a grand total of three palliative
care facilities to serve the terminally ill in its population. In contrast, England, which forbids
physician-assisted suicide, has 185. Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1, at 51-52.
61. AMA Brief in Quill, supra note 21, at 7.
62. Id. The AMA lists a number of current obstacles to effective palliative care, including:
lack of professional training and knowledge, misconceptions about the risk of
addiction and respiratory depression associated with pain medication, inadequate
communication (reflecting both inadequate attention from health care professionals
and undue reluctance of patients and their families to use pain relief medication),
and concern over criminal or licensure actions against the prescribing physicians.
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system to discount suicide and offer more legal treatment options, will
serve both the medical profession's and patient interests better than
death.63
III. LEGALIZATION'S NEW MARKET, NEW OPPORTUNISTS
If the Supreme Court elects to overturn the laws of nearly every
state,' nothing short of a wholesale use of physician-assisted suicide,
and eventually euthanasia, is likely to result. "[L]ethal medication could
be proposed as a treatment ... to every competent, terminally ill person
in the country." 65 But while the ramifications of such a decision are
obvious, what is not obvious is who the most likely victims and benefi-
ciaries will be. In a perfect world, only those individuals with a well-
reasoned and voluntary desire to commit suicide will choose the option.
In a perfect world, no one benefits or profits from the decision, except
perhaps the patient (if death can ever truly be a benefit). America,
unfortunately, is not a perfect world.
63. The AMA recommends several options to medical professionals instead of the acceptance
and practice of physician-assisted suicide:
1. [Acceptance of the statement that] [p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally
inconsistent with the physician's professional role.
2. It is critical that the medical profession redouble its efforts to ensure that dying
patients are provided optimal treatment for their pain and other discomfort. The use
of more aggressive comfort care measures, including greater reliance on hospice
care, can alleviate the physical and emotional suffering that dying patients
experience. Evaluation and treatment by a health professional with expertise in the
psychiatric aspects of terminal illness can often alleviate the suffering that leads a
patient to desire assisted suicide.
3. Physicians must resist the natural tendency to withdraw physically and
emotionally from their terminally ill patients. When the treatment goals for a
patient in the end stages of a terminal illness shift from curative efforts to comfort
care, the level of physician involvement in the patient's care should in no way
decrease.
4. Requests for physician-assisted suicide should be a signal to the physician that
the patient's needs are unmet and further evaluation to identify the elements
contributing to the patient's suffering is necessary. Multidisciplinary intervention,
including specialty consultation, pastoral care, family counseling, and other
modalities, should be sought as clinically indicated.
5. Further efforts to educate physicians about advanced pain management
techniques, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, are necessary to
overcome any shortcomings in this area. Physicians should recognize that courts
and regulatory bodies readily distinguish between use of narcotic drugs to relieve
pain in dying patients and use in other situations.
Glasson, supra note 59, at 96-97.
64. At oral argument, the Court, asking counsel for the physicians to justify their position,
stated "you are asking to overturn the laws of, now, all states but one." Oral Argument in
Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 46.
65. Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 22.
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A. The Medically Disenfranchised
Proponents of the right to physician-assisted suicide insist they are
asking only that mentally competent, terminally ill patients be given the
right to choose suicide. What they do not acknowledge, however, is the
threat of abuse and undue influence on those decisions. Those most
likely to be victimized by the practice are patients whose choices are not
truly voluntary, because no other realistic options are available to them.
These are the same people currently victimized by America's inequita-
ble health care system: the medically disenfranchised poor, minorities,
elderly, and disabled.66
Among the many factors that influence Americans' health care
decisions, money is the most invidious. Financial considerations may
not make a patient's decision to commit suicide irrational. However, for
certain groups, those financial considerations are so predominant as to
be coersive, and therefore, inconsistent with true voluntariness. The dis-
parity in medical care, both physical and mental, that the poor, elderly,
and minorities receive is well-documented.67 For this reason, the AMA
fears that:
Once established, the right to physician-assisted suicide would create
profound danger for many ill persons with undiagnosed depression
and inadequately treated pain, for whom physician-assisted suicide
rather than good palliative care could become the norm. At greatest
risk would be those with the least access to palliative care-the poor,
the elderly, and members of minority groups. 68
Those who must rely on Medicare and Medicaid are particularly at risk.
Oregon Medicaid recipients, for example, face almost certain financial
coercion in a state with legalized physician-assisted suicide and
mandatory health care rationing. Oregon's Medicaid law, touted as a
model for the rest of the country, denies coverage for life-sustaining
treatments deemed not cost-effective, but covers the cost of physician-
66. See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and
Disabled et al. in Support of Petitioners at 26, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted sub nom. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110)
and Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858)
[hereinafter National Legal Center Brief]. The National Legal Center fears that legalizing
physician-assisted suicide "would, in effect, declare that death is a 'benefit' for ... persons with
disabilities." Id.
67. See, e.g., Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic
Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592 (1994). In Cleeland's study, "patients seen at centers that
treated predominantly minorities were three times more likely that those treated elsewhere to have
inadequate pain management." Id. at 595.
68. AMA Brief in Quill, supra note 21, at 2.
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assisted suicide.69 If the rest of the country follows Oregon's example,
financially coerced suicide may become the norm in a society facing the
prospect of health care rationing.7°
What's more, once physician-assisted suicide becomes readily
available, many patients will feel duty-bound to "die and get out of the
way," as Dick Lamm, former governor of Colorado, so eloquently put
it.7 The reality is that many patients face an illusory choice of treat-
ments at the end of life. One is prohibitively expensive or virtually inac-
cessible. The other is a "cheap and easy expedient. '72 Even patients
who desperately wish to live for what ever time they have left may
choose death rather than financial ruin for those who survive them.
B. The Beneficiaries
Compounding the financial influence on end-of-life treatment deci-
sions is the role of insurance in American health care. As is readily
apparent, "[t]he least costly treatment for any illness is lethal medica-
tion."73 Insurance companies are poised to capitalize on America's new-
est market, the terminally-ill. The prospects for profit are endless. As
America has long recognized, however, there is something immoral,
inhuman, in profiteering in human lives.74  In fact, the Dutch medical
establishment, working in a society that openly advocates and practices
69. See Richard M. Doerflinger, Conclusion: Shaky Foundations and Slippery Slopes, 35
Duo. L. REv. 523, 529 (1996) (citation omitted).
70. See Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care Rationing, 72 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 873 (1995) (footnote omitted). Professor Fleck characterizes the dilemma as
follows:
[If] physician-assisted suicide were [a] socially permitted option[], .... these
individuals could be subtly cajoled into choosing this type of death. This would
result in additional health care savings and provide society with a 'compassionate'
response to the otherwise pointless suffering these individuals would endure. But,
quite obviously, this is not compassion in any morally defensible sense. Rather, it is
a clear compounding of injustices. It is the worst kind of discrimination
hypocritically masked as compassion .... A more accurate label for this sort of
practice would be nonvoluntary social euthanasia.
Id. at 873-74. See also Barry R. Furrow, Setting Limits in the Dying Zone: Assisted Suicide,
Scarce Resources, and Hard Cases, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 901 (1995).
71. Alan Tonelson, A Look at the Lamm Candidacy: Or Is the Sky Really Falling?; Lamm is
the Rare Pol Willing to Face Reality, WASH. POST, July 28, 1996, at C3. See also C. Everett
Koop, Introduction to Special Issue: A Symposium on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 35 DUQ. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1996) (stating that lethal medication may be used to "get [the patient] 'out of misery'
and off of one's hands by killing the patient as quickly as possible").
72. Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 26.
73. Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 25.
74. How ironic it will be if the Due Process Clause, adopted and ratified specifically to
overrule Dred Scott, is used to once again set this nation on the path to bartering in human lives.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-2, at 549 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
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physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia agrees. They strongly counsel
against the United States legalizing physician-assisted suicide because
the "difficulty of preventing the profit motive from making euthanasia
and assisted suicide a lucrative business" would "contaminat[e] the pro-
cess" in the United States.
75
Unfortunately, the Dutch are right. The stage is already set for
America's insurance industry to exploit the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide. The terminally ill comprise a currently exploding mar-
ket for health and life insurers, as well as viatical settlement companies.
Legalizing physician-assisted suicide creates potential profit for these
businesses no matter which decision terminally ill patients might make
at the end of life.
76
While no one is certain that insurance companies will take advan-
tage of suicide as a treatment option,77 the prospect that insurers will
offer policies excluding expensive end-of-life treatment, but covering
the cost of lethal medication is frightening enough. However, even
without express exclusions, health care rationing is inherent in managed
care plans, and that alone increases the odds of suicide becoming com-
monplace.78 "[Managed care] [p]lans pervasively require utilization
review in order to examine treatment prospectively, concurrently, or ret-
rospectively and determine whether the [managed care organization]
will pay for the treatment. This creates a mechanism for blocking treat-
ment coverage," that may leave patients with little alternative to
suicide.79
75. Hendin, Seduced by Death, supra note 47, at 165. The Netherlands provides its citizens
universal health care coverage, which, among other things, removes profit motive as an influence
on decisions to commit suicide or perform euthanasia.
76. See Debra J. Saunders, Sharpened Pencils are Ready to Reduce High Cost of Dying,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, November 17, 1994, at D13. Saunders pictures "insurance and health
maintenance organization executives ... rubbing their hands in glee over the passage of the so-
called Death With Dignity Act passed by Oregon voters." Id.
77. See Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1, at 29 ("We don't know to what extent
insurance companies, as they have indicated in Oregon, would quickly say 'of course we will pay
for this treatment while they are not paying for a hospitalization for palliative treatment."').
78. See generally Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed
Care, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 455 (1996).
79. Id. at 462 (footnote omitted). Two other factors exacerbate the effect of cost-containment
on the availability of alternatives to suicide. First, for-profit managed care plans feature physician
incentives that reward cost cutting treatment and punish overutilization. Id, at 461-62. See also,
Sylvia L. Wenger, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, et al. v.
Travelers Insurance Company, et al.: Medical Malpractice and Enabling Regulation in States
Again, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 131, 139 & n.42 (1996). Second, the wide latitude given to managed
care plans to make medical determinations through utilization review applies to all plans governed
by ERISA. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144
(1994); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976
F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1847 (1993).
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A recent article analyzed whether managed care plans can legally
refuse to cover treatments that the plan deems experimental or futile.8°
Particularly disturbing is the concept of legally denying benefits to
patients on the basis of "futility." By definition, terminal illness implies
that, to some extent, any treatment is futile. Yet, the courts have upheld
such denials. An example is Barnett v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,
Inc.8" Barnett considered whether a managed care plan could refuse to
pay for a lifesaving liver transplant and held that "poor survival rate is
an acceptable medical criterion" for determining whether to offer a treat-
ment option.82 The court upheld the managed care plan's refusal to
cover the treatment, rejecting the patient's contention that the decision
was motivated by financial concerns for cost savings.8 3
This inherent conflict between profit motive and patient care can
only "heighten the risk of error and abuse" for managed care patients.84
Terminally ill patients denied coverage for treatments under the guise of
utilization review will be forced to choose between the readily available,
"cheap and easy" lethal dose or the prospect of an agonized death. This
is no choice. Only the affluent, capable of financing the more costly
treatments themselves, will truly have a choice.
Unfortunately, health insurers are not the only potential profiteers
in the new market in the terminally ill. They have the company of life
insurers. Able to avoid paying on the policies of terminally ill patients
who opt for suicide, life insurance companies stand to profit from legal-
ized physician-assisted suicide. A standard clause in nearly every life
insurance policy issued in the United States is the suicide exclusion,
which denies benefits if an insured commits suicide within two years of
purchasing the policy.85 To address this concern, the Oregon Death
With Dignity Act redefines suicide to prevent insurers from denying
benefits.86 The legality of redefining such a traditional insurance term
of art is debatable. Nevertheless, this new statutory definition of suicide
may simply force insurance companies to shift their source of profit by
80. See Furrow, supra note 70.
81. 32 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1994).
82. Id. at 417.
83. Id.
84. Wolf, supra note 78, at 466. Wolf continues: 'The elderly and poor 'account for a
disproportionate share of health care expenditures and are, therefore, prime targets of cost
containment. This suggests that those individuals would also have a heightened risk of being
urged toward assisted suicide rather than toward the costly care they would otherwise merit." Id.
(footnote omitted).
85. See Patrick O'Neill, No Ordinary Prescription: Q & A on Doctor Assisted Suicide,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, November 10, 1994, at B1.
86. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.875 (1995) provides, in pertinent part: "Neither shall a qualified
patient's act of ingesting medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner have
an effect upon a life, health, or accident insurance or annuity policy."
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charging higher premiums.8 7
Finally, new players in the terminally ill market are viatical settle-
ment companies which currently enjoy huge profits.88  Viatical settle-
ment allows terminally ill insureds to sell their policies at fifty to ninety
percent of face value while still alive. On a half million dollar policy,
that is up to $250,000.00 profit for the purchaser. Criticizing these com-
panies for taking advantage of the terminally ill,8 9 states are just begin-
ning to regulate viatical settlements with licensing requirements.9" Of
course, if a patient is denied expensive treatment by his health insurance
provider, viatical settlement companies are ready, willing and able to
"fill the void left by insurers.
'91
More frightening are the creative possibilities that may become
reality if physician-assisted suicide is legalized. A modest proposal has
been offered up by one advocate of physician-assisted suicide, K.K.
Fung, a professor of economics at the University of Memphis.92 Fung
has suggested that "insurance companies give rebates to terminally ill
patients who agree to kill themselves," leaving "money [that] would be
distributed to their heirs after their death. 93 Giving prizes for taking the
pill is among the most barbaric possibilities awaiting a society on which
legalized suicide is unleashed.
Terminally ill patients confronted with inevitable death may
become victims of big business as well as fate regardless of the choice
they make. Patients with the desire to live as long as possible may face
the prospect of being refused lifesaving treatment if an insurance pro-
vider determines that treatment is experimental or futile. In other words,
patients may be told their lives are not worth the cost. Faced with this
knowledge, patients might choose to "die with dignity," and take the
87. See O'Neill, supra note 85. One insurance company spokesman noted that "[n]o
insurance company would sell a policy to someone with a terminal illness." Id. Further, he noted
that insurers are worried about Oregon's law, and "will be watching to see how much additional
cost will be associated" with it. Id.
88. See Amey Stone, Easing the Economic Burdens of Terminal Illness, BUSINESS WEEK,
May 3, 1993, at 160; see also Pamela Sherrid, Enriching the Final Days, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., August 21, 1995, at 56 (viatical settlement companies purchased over $300 million worth of
life insurance policies in 1994 alone); Jim Connelly, Viaticals Attract Institutional Money, NAT.
UNDERWRITERS, Nov. 21, 1994, at 3 (viatical industry expected to grow to 3 to 4 billion by turn of
the century).
89. See Anonymous, Buyer of AIDS Patients' Insurance Quitting, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996,
at D5 (reporting that the country's first viatical settlement company pulled out of the business




92. See Lane, supra note 52.
93. Id. Fung estimates that "[i]f everybody who has a terminal illness chose to die early, the
savings would be big .... I mean major league-$S50 or $60 billion a year." Id.
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lethal dose, which is likely to be covered by insurance. On the other
hand, if some patients still refuse the "cheap and easy expedient," want-
ing instead to avail themselves to whatever treatments hold out hope of
saving their lives, viatical settlement companies will come to the rescue
to purchase their life insurance policies at a steep discount, giving
patients the "opportunity" to finance their own treatments.
IV. THE VERITABLE QUICKSAND OF STATE REGULATION
Rather than simply strike down state prohibitions, the Court may
recognize a right to physician-assisted suicide,94 but allow states to regu-
late the practice much in the same way states regulate refusal of treat-
ment.95 This approach may seem the most prudent way to balance
conflicting patient and state interests. However, it's appeal is short-lived
once one asks a simple question: is meaningful regulation possible?96
More importantly, can the regulations prevent what is most feared and
what the available empirical evidence suggests is inevitable-the slow
"gravitation out of physician-assisted suicide into euthanasia?"9 7 The
short answer to these questions is no. Regulation will do little to hold
the line. Indeed, it will most likely leave the states, the courts, the med-
ical profession, and the public mired in veritable quicksand for
generations.
Determining whether meaningful regulation of physician-assisted
suicide is possible first requires ascertaining exactly what proponents
would have the states regulate. As previously noted, proponents claim
that the class of individuals entitled to commit assisted suicide is quite
small.98 Proponents would have the right conferred only on those com-
petent, terminally ill patients able to take life-ending medication
94. Alternatively, the Court may assume the right exists, as it did in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
95. See id.
96. Because the proponent's argument rests almost entirely on the assumption that only those
patients who make a voluntary and informed choice to commit suicide should have the
opportunity to do so, at a minimum the right must be susceptible to regulation. See Mark Strasser,
Assisted Suicide and the Competent Terminally Ill, 74 OR. L. REV. 539, 563-64 (1995).
97. Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 7. At oral argument, the Court again and
again queried the parties regarding this risk. See generally Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra
note 1; Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1.
98. The inconsistency of recognizing a constitutional right and then allowing its exercise by
so few individuals has been duly noted by the Court. See Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra
note 1, at 27-36. As the Court succinctly stated, "To say that as a matter of constitutional due
process, you include the person who is able to take the pill herself but exclude the one
[experiencing emotional or chronic suffering] whose mental state is the same? I don't understand
how you get that line out of a grand due process clause." Id. at 31. See also Thomas J. Marzen,
"Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 799, 800 (1994).
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themselves.99
To prevent abuse, proponents suggest that states impose strict
guidelines patients must satisfy before they can exercise their right to
physician-assisted suicide. 1°° Generally, the proposed guidelines require
four safeguards before a patient can be assisted in his or her suicide: 101
consent, mental competence, voluntariness, and terminal illness.102
However, the crucial question regarding these safeguards is whether any
universal, and more importantly, objective, definition of these terms can
be used to set clear limits on physician-assisted suicide.
First evaluate voluntariness. Proponents would ensure that the right
to physician-assisted suicide will be adequately regulated by requiring
patients to self-administer, i.e., voluntarily take the lethal drug.'03 This
notion of voluntariness is illusory. Voluntariness goes much deeper than
mere physical dexterity. True voluntariness implies a decision free of
inappropriate influence. Indeed, a choice is only as voluntary as the
quality of viable alternatives to that choice. Unfortunately, many termi-
nally ill patients simply will not have adequate alternatives under a
regime of legalized physician-assisted suicide.104 "[I]n the context of
99. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Some proponents of physician-assisted suicide
would go further, and would limit the right to an even smaller class of terminally ill patients-
those patients "whose suffering simply cannot be relieved, even with the best medical care
(including terminal sedation)." Hospice Coalition Brief, supra note 48, at 4. Terminal sedation
refers to the practice of putting a patient in a drug-induced coma to relieve or prevent severe pain.
Id. at 10. The Hospice Coalition points to evidence suggesting that a small percentage of patients
given terminal sedation continue to feel pain. See id. at 11. Thus, physician-assisted suicide is
proffered as the only humane alternative remaining to this small group.
100. Model statutes have been drafted for states contemplating legalizing physician-assisted
suicide. See Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1 (1996); see also Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 18-25
(discussing proposed state legislation).
101. See Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 25. The Netherland guidelines for physician-
assisted suicide and euthanasia have facilitated much of the discussion and scrutiny of proposed
legislation in the United States. The failure of the Netherlands guidelines to limit the now
rampant use of both voluntary and involuntary euthanasia is well documented. See e.g., Herbert
Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 427 (1996) [hereinafter
Hendin, The Slippery Slope] ("Virtually every guideline established by the Dutch... has failed to
protect patients or has been modified or violated with impunity.").
102. Indeed, the Oregon statute, proposed as a model for other states, adopts similar guidelines.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1995).
103. See supra note 28. As noted earlier, physician-assisted suicide is defined as an act of the
patient, where the patient ingests the lethal medication prescribed by the physician. Necessarily,
the patient must be able to take the drugs himself or herself. Proponents claim that, defined this
way, the class of persons to whom the right will be extended is quite small. See Oral Argument in
Quill, supra note 1, at 30 (proponents claim that self-administration will assure that the patient is
committing suicide voluntarily); see also Baron et al., supra note 100, at 10 (limiting statute to
physician-assisted suicide to assure patient responsibility and resolve to die, as well as to appease
public, legislators and physicians).
104. John Pickering, Chair of the American Bar Association Commission on Legal Problems
of the Elderly, noted:
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cost containment and the millions of citizens who remain uninsured and
underinsured and risk poverty from lengthy or chronic illness, voluntari-
ness is an honorable ideal, although difficult to ensure or guarantee
through legislative intent."'' 0 5 Without greater equity in access to and
delivery of health care, physical voluntariness as a safeguard against
abuse will be a mere facade behind which a lack of real alternatives will
remain as a hidden, but common influence on terminally ill patients'
choices to commit suicide.
Consent likewise falls far short of providing a meaningful limit on
the use of physician-assisted suicide. Consent, as normally used in med-
ical decision-making, has more to do with limiting caregiver liability
than it does patient willingness. "In practice, consent has all too often
become a tool of risk management for purposes of creating a liability-
proof record of patient care in the event of lawsuits."'0 6 In the context
of physician-assisted suicide, however, consent should be expected to
operate differently than it does in typical medical treatment delivery.1
0 7
The level of proof necessary to establish consent to suicide ought to
reflect the gravity of what the patient is consenting to.' 08 Unfortunately,
it does not.'0 9
The consent safeguard only insures against liability because it can
do no more. Ultimately, patient consent is based on inherently subjec-
Before there can be such truly voluntary choice to terminate life, there must be
universal access to affordable health care. The lack of access to or the financial
burdens of health care hardly permit voluntary choice for many. What may be
voluntary in Beverly Hills is not likely to be voluntary in Watts.
Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 19, at 738-39 (quoting John H. Pickering, The
Continuing Debate over Active Euthanasia, BIOETHiCS BULLETIN (ABA), Summer 1994).
105. Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 42.
106. Id. at 27; see also OR. REv. STAT. § 127.885 (providing immunities from liability for
assisting suicide where doctor acts in good faith).
107. In the typical consent process, the patient is required to sign documents listing the risks
associated with their decision. The process sometimes includes conversation with the attending
physician, though this is not required. See Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 27-28.
108. See id. at 36.
109. See Oregon Death With Dignity Act, supra note 31. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act
defines "informed decision" as:
a decision by a qualified patient, to request and obtain a prescription to end his or
her life in a humane and dignified manner, that is based on an appreciation of the
relevant facts and after being fully informed by the attending physician of:
(a) His or her medical diagnosis;
(b) His or her prognosis;
(c) The potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed;
(d) The probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed;
(e) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care
and pain control.
OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(7) (1995).
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tive criteria." l° As the court noted in Lee v. Oregon, consent under the
Death With Dignity Act is "based on a person's own rational assessment
of the quality and value of their life," not on objective proof.' An
individual's subjective assessment is a poor substitute for objective legal
standards, and thus cannot provide a meaningful limit on physician-
assisted suicide.' 
1 2
The competency safeguard presents its own problems. Compe-
tency assumes that the medical profession is always able to recognize
and diagnose depression. A diagnosis of depression would preclude a
finding of competency to decide whether to exercise the right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide.' '3 Nonrecognition of depression, which is com-
mon in terminally ill patients,' makes determinations of competency
unreliable. "Neither clinical medicine nor jurisprudence can entirely
eliminate the inherent subjectivity of assessing someone to be of sound
mind." "5 This creates a substantial and unacceptable risk that patients
with easily treatable depression may needlessly go to death.
Proponents respond to the potential inadequacies of voluntariness,
consent, or competency by noting that that the practice is in any event
available only to the terminally ill. While terminal illness would seem
to offer a clear line beyond which the right to physician-assisted suicide
could not extend, it does not. In reality, that line too is hard to deter-
mine. Aside from metaphysical questions," 6 there seems to be little
consensus on the definition of terminal illness. 17 The great weakness in
defining the term is the well documented medical fact that doctors can
only guess at life expectancy. Studies suggest that physician determina-
tions of length of survival have error rates of up to sixty percent." 8 If a
110. See Strasser, supra note 96, at 550 & n.68 ("The individual must use her own values and
preferences to make the decision.").
111. 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (D. Or. 1995).
112. See Hendin, The Slippery Slope, supra note 101, at 428 (patients' subjective
determinations explain why Dutch have been unsuccessful in preventing euthanasia of healthy,
depressed patients).
113. Further, depression in particular may explain the patient's reason for requesting suicide.
See Eric Chevlen, The Limits of Prognostication, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 337, 346 (1996) (15% of
people with clinical depression die by suicide).
114. Up to 42% of patients with serious illness are clinically depressed. See id.
115. Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 35. "[E]xperts underscore the inability of depressed
persons to recognize the severity of their own symptoms and the failure of primary physicians to
detect major depression." Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 19, at 760.
116. See Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 28, the court noting that, in a sense,
we are all terminal, "it's just a matter of time."
117. See Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 19, at 740 (noting that terminal illness
is variously defined as "a condition that will produce death 'imminently' or 'within a short time'
or in six months or a year").
118. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (D. Or. 1995) (stating that "even for
physicians who specialize in treating a terminal disease, no precise definition is medically or
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diagnosis of terminal illness is going to be the basis for allowing a
patient to commit suicide, error ridden determinations surely cannot pro-
vide adequate safeguards against needless death.
Beyond semantics and definitional ambiguity, one other obstacle
leaves meaningful regulation of physician-assisted suicide in doubt. The
flaw, which some suggest is fatal, is doctor-patient confidentiality."1 9
"The practice of physician-assisted suicide is in principle unregulatable,
insofar as it will occur in the privacy of the doctor-patient relation-
ship."' z Because "private medical matters become affairs of govern-
ment when the state sanctions them,"1 2' the state must invade the doctor-
patient relationship for adequate regulation to occur. 2 2 Proponents only
presume that such regulation can occur without destroying the sanctity
of that relationship. 23 Yet, any hope of regulating an act that occurs
within a private and protected relationship, which also results in the
death of the only witness, is unfounded, if not irrational. 24
Given the inherently subjective and illusory nature of each pro-
posed safeguard, the prospects for adequate regulation are dim. Each
safeguard-voluntariness, consent, competency, and terminal illness-
contains inherent flaws which simply do not reflect the grave and unique
nature of the act of physician-assisted suicide. Given the extraordinary
lengths to which our legal system goes to protect the lives of convicted
criminals, shouldn't the same standards apply to the innocent? Authori-
ties maintain that any regulation of physician-assisted suicide will fail to
hold the line and will fail to protect the innocent.'25 The question really
is not whether adequate safeguards can be established to prevent abuse,
but whether the right to physician-assisted suicide can be regulated at
all.
legally possible, since only in hindsight is it known with certainty when someone is going to
die."); see also Chevlen, supra note 113, at 350.
119. See Leon R. Kass & Nelson Lund, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics and the
Future of the Medical Profession, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 395, 414 (1996).
120. Id.
121. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. at 1438.
122. See Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 8-10.
123. See Strasser, supra note 96, at 609.
124. "Precisely the principle that allows doctors and patients to reach private agreements-
doctor-patient confidentiality-no less assures them that [physician-assisted suicide] decisions can
continue to be effectively hidden." See Callahan & White, supra note 32, at 9.
125. See generally Hendin, Seduced by Death, supra note 47; Kamisar, Against Assisted
Suicide, supra note 19; see also Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. at 1438 (holding that Death With
Dignity Act fails to protect against abuse). But see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.
Supp. 1454, 1465 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("The court has no doubt that the legislature can devise
regulations which will define the appropriate boundaries of physician-assisted suicide").
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V. THE VERY REAL THREAT OF DOCTRINAL SLIPPAGE
Proponents promise that any line drawn by state legislatures will be
tested over and over. As noted at oral argument, "[O]ne can see a law-
yer criticizing any line that the legislature would come up with ....
Any line would be subject to meaningful scrutiny."' 26 Thus, the fallacy
of meaningful regulation will create more questions than answers, more
opportunities to expand the right beyond the terminally ill, and forge the
way for euthanasia. 27
Indeed, if the right to physician-assisted suicide is to be constitu-
126. Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1, at 50-51. Accord Kamisar, Against Assisted
Suicide, supra note 20.
Is there any doubt that lawyers would soon appear in court arguing that (a) the new
right could not be limited to the terminally ill, but had to apply as well to others who
would experience unacceptable suffering for many years; and that (b) the new right
could not be limited to assisted suicide, but had to include active voluntary
euthanasia, at least for those severely ill patients who were unable to perform the
"final act" themselves?
Id. at 749-50.
127. The Court rightly anticipates continued judicial intervention, possibly as extensive as that
following desegregation, in determining which regulations are permissible and which are not. The
Court continued:
But surely that's what the next couple of generations are going to have to deal with,
what regulations are permissible ... [if the right is upheld] .... [Ylou're going to
have [ ] factions fighting it out in every session of the legislature, how far can we go
in regulating this. And that will be a Constitutional decision in every case ....
[There is no doubt that it would result if we upheld [physician-assisted suicide], it
would result in a flow of cases through [t]he Court system for heaven knows how
long.
Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 38-39. The Court is no doubt aware of the myriad
cases that have followed the Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decision. Courts
have had to decide nearly every aspect of public education policy. See Jerald J. Director, Annota-
tion, Federal Court Regulation of School Construction or Facility so as to Avoid School Segrega-
tion, 4 A.L.R. FED. 979 (1970) (citing cases requiring courts to intervene in such activities as
additions to school buildings, participation in athletic activities and school bands, architect's fees
for school construction, bus routes, selection of sites for proposed schools, cafeterias, the right to
participate in school clubs, faculty selection, selection of a name for a new school, quality of
busses, libraries, use of school meeting rooms, overcrowding, discrimination in Parent-Teacher
Association, access to school plays and theatrical activities, field trips, reading rooms, repairs of
school buildings, and traffic conditions).
Extensive regulation of desegregation is beyond reproach, indeed it is necessary to effectuate
a constitutional mandate. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1477-78. Challenges to the regulation of a
right as dubious as physician-assisted suicide, however necessary, have no laudable purpose.
Rather, proponents of physician-assisted suicide promise protracted challenges to state regulation
in order to extend the right to suicide beyond the terminally ill, and eventually to euthanasia.
Indeed, "[a]dvocates ... see [legalization of assisted suicide] as a first step, more likely to be
accepted than euthanasia," their ultimate goal. Hendin, Seduced by Death, supra note 47, at 124.
See also Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1432 & n.3 (D. Or. 1995) (supporters candidly admit
that Oregon Death With Dignity Act candidly is first step to extending right to "others who con-
sent"); Peter M. McGough, M.D., Medical Concerns About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEAT-
TL L. REv. 521, 529 (1995). They may succeed.
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tionally recognized at all, the Equal Protection clause demands that the
right be expanded. 28  The basic argument will go something like this:
The Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly situated persons be
treated alike.' 29 Legislation that distinguishes between similarly situated
persons must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be
upheld under Equal Protection scrutiny.' 30 The Constitution recognizes
the right of patients, both competent and incompetent, to refuse medical
treatment. 13  After a decision in Quill and Glucksberg, the Constitution
will also recognize the affirmative right of a mentally competent, termi-
nally ill patient to commit physician-assisted suicide, presumably
because no nonarbitrary difference exists between those patients and
people on life support.
132
Proponents will then argue that no nonarbitrary difference exists
between those two groups and myriad other groups that can justify limit-
ing the right only to the competent terminally ill.1 33 Under rational basis
review, the states will be required to offer meaningful differences
between the competent, terminally ill and the challengers that promotes
the state's interests in protecting one, but not the other. Unless they do,
the nation will surely witness the "slow gravitation out of physician-
assisted suicide into euthanasia."'' 34  Sadly, the states stand little chance
of finding such distinctions.
35
128. The Harvard model statute already extends the right beyond the terminally ill to any
patient suffering from "intractable and unbearable suffering." Baron, supra note 100, at 11.
Extending the right to persons in chronic pain seems intuitively more logical than permitting
suicide only by the terminally ill, because a person suffering from a chronic (but not terminal)
illness will suffer more pain in the long run than a person with six months to live. "ITihe patient
who has ten years of agony to look forward to has a more appealing case than the patient who is at
the threshold of death." Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 27. As recommended and
as logic would dictate, unbearable pain and suffering is a wholly subjective, and therefore, an
unregulatable criterion for determining whether to allow a person to commit physician-assisted
suicide. See Baron, supra note 100, at 11 (no objective standard should be imposed for unbearable
suffering).
129. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
130. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
131. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
132. The court in Quill v. Vacco held that:
Withdrawal of life support requires physicians or those acting at their direction
physically to remove equipment and, often, to administer palliative drugs which
may themselves contribute to death. The ending of life by these means is nothing
more nor less than assisted suicide. It simply cannot be said that those mentally
competent, terminally-ill persons who seek to hasten death but whose treatment
does not include life support are treated equally.
80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis supplied).
133. See supra note 128.
134. Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 7.
135. The Quill court continued:
[W]hat interest can the state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life that
is all but ended? Surely, the state's interest lessens as the potential for life
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Extending the right to physician-assisted suicide beyond the termi-
nally ill follows necessarily from a decision recognizing the right in the
first instance. Indeed, "the next case will argue . . . that [the right]
should be extended ... to the chronically ill,' ' t 36 among others. Propo-
nents will use the Equal Protection argument outlined above to force the
states to recognize the right of every mentally competent, chronically ill
patient to commit physician-assisted suicide.
To prevent that, states will have to find meaningful differences
between the terminally ill and chronically ill. Life expectancy is one
possible difference. The ability of that line of demarcation to stand is,
however, tenuous at best because, as discussed above, these determina-
tions are little more than guesswork. 37 Not only is such a distinction
inaccurate, it is dangerous because "if proximity to death is the variable
that governs when the [state's] interest in protecting life diminishes, then
advanced age alone should warrant assisted suicide. ' 138 The state can-
not have much interest in a life whose quality is so diminished, as
"[c]hronic, painful, and serious[ ] but not life-threatening conditions
may impose burdens on the individual, the caregiver, or the State signifi-
cantly greater than any which accompany terminal conditions."' 39
Hence, a state will be hard pressed to respond to the question of "what
business is it of the state to require" a patient to live in "agony?"'
' 40
After all, a person in chronic pain is equally, if not more deserving of a
right to suicide than the terminally ill patient since he will endure his
agony longer. The states will be unable to answer the question after
Glucksberg and Quill.
A subsequent case will argue that people suffering emotional pain
deserve suicide no less than the terminally ill and chronically ill. Distin-
guishing between physical and mental pain is no less arbitrary that dis-
tinguishing between the pain of the terminally ill and chronically ill.' 4'
diminishes .... And what business is it of the state to require the continuation of
agony when the result is imminent and inevitable? What concern prompts the state
to interfere with a mentally competent patient's "right to define [his] own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,". .. when
the patient seeks to have drugs prescribed to end life during the final stages of a
terminal illness? The greatly reduced interest of the state in preserving life compels
the answer to these questions: "None."
80 F.3d at 729-30 (citation omitted).
See also Yale Kamisar, The "Right to Die": On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DuQ. L REV.
481 (1996) [hereinafter Kamisar, The "Right to Die").
136. Oral argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 8.
137. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
138. National Legal Center Brief, supra note 66, at 12.
139. Id. at 13; see also note 128.
140. Quill v. Vaco, 80 F.3d at 730.
141. See Oral Argument in Glucksberg, supra note 1, at 32-35.
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What right does a state have to require its citizens to endure unbearable
emotional suffering, when it allows patients in unbearable physical suf-
fering to end their pain with suicide? "What concern prompts the state
to interfere with a . . . patient's "right to define [his] own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life?" '42 If the Netherlands are any example, chronically depressed
patients will win the right to suicide." 3
Proponents will also inevitably challenge as arbitrary state laws that
require patients to self-administer the lethal dose. After all, what nonar-
bitrary difference exists between patients who can and cannot self-
administer? This distinction is even more tenuous than the one between
the withdrawal of life support and physician-assisted suicide.' 4  In fact,
"it may be difficult to make a principled distinction between physician-
assisted suicide and the provision to terminally ill patients of other forms
of life-ending medical assistance, such as the administration of drugs by
a physician. "145
Although the Compassion in Dying court expressly limited its hold-
ing to "the critical line between voluntary and involuntary termination of
an individual's life,"'14 6 it correctly noted that, under state law, the "deci-
sion of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal pur-
poses the decision of the patient himself."'14 7 If the general rule is that
patients are entitled to execute advance directives listing their treatment
choices, or alternatively, are entitled to delegate their treatment deci-
sions to a surrogate, what justification can a state have for prohibiting a
142. Quill, 80 F.3d at 730 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
143. See Hendin, Seduced by Death, supra note 47, at 145-153 (discussing the case of Netty
Boomsma, a bereaved mother whose suicide was assisted by a doctor who determined that her
chronic depression warranted such intervention).
144. See Kamisar, The "Right to Die," supra note 135, at 486 n.27. Kamisar argues that the
real counterpart to withdrawal of life support is not physician-assisted suicide, but voluntary
euthanasia, because in both instances, the physician performs the act that ends the patient's life.
145. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 831 (9th Cir.) cert. granted sub nom.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110).
146. Id. at 832.
147. Id. at n.120. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2980-2994 (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 1997).
Section 2981 provides in part that "[elvery adult shall be presumed competent to appoint a health
care agent .... " Section 2982 provides in part that "[a]n agent shall have the authority to make
any and all health care decisions on the principal's behalf that the principal could make." That
section also lays out decision making standards for the agent:
[T]he agent shall make health care decisions: (a) in accordance with the
principal's wishes, including the principal's religious and moral beliefs; or (b) if the
principal's wishes are not reasonably known and cannot with reasonable diligence
be ascertained, in accordance with the principal's best interests; provided, however,
that if the principal's wishes regarding [life sustaining treatment] are not reasonably
known and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained, the agent shall not have
the authority to make decisions regarding these measures.
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patient from listing euthanasia as a permissible treatment or prohibiting
a surrogate from making that decision?
For example, New York's health care proxy law specifically pro-
hibits a health care agent from making such a decision. 48 However, the
statute states that it only prohibits an agent from consenting to "any act
or omission to which the principal could not consent under the law."149
Clearly, if a patient may himself legally request assisted suicide or vol-
untary euthanasia, so can his surrogate. America will have legalized
euthanasia.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide usually dismiss oppo-
nents' slippery slope arguments with claims that the slippery slope is no
more than "Chicken Little" rhetoric. 5 ' They claim that fears of state
sanctioned euthanasia are unfounded.1"' They are either deliriously
optimistic' 52 or disingenuous.1 53 The proverbial writing is already on
the wall. As C. Everett Koop warns:
This author does believe in the slippery slope, as must any stu-
dent of German history from World War I through the Holocaust....
No competent individual would be safe from lethal injection if this
theory is carried to its logical conclusion in the future climate of
America[n] health care with an aging population, spiraling costs, and
an unwary public.
1 54
148. Section 2989 provides, in part: 'This article is not intended to permit or promote suicide,
assisted suicide, or euthanasia."
149. Id.
150. "[T]he opponents of assisted-suicide conjure up a parade of horribles and insist that the
only way to halt the downward spiral is to stop it before it starts." Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d at 830.
151. 'There is no reason to believe that legalizing assisted suicide will lead to the horrific
consequences its opponents suggest." Id. at 831.
152. See id. at 833 (noting that "[wlhile there is always room for error in any human endeavor,
we believe that sufficient protections can and will be developed by the various states.").
153. See supra notes 49, 128 and accompanying text.
154. Koop, supra note 71, at 4. Koop's reference to the Holocaust is by no means an
unwarranted comparison. Jewish groups have reminded the Court that they represent: "a people
whose numbers were decimated little more than half-a-century ago by a society that 'progressed'
from its 'enlightened' practices of 'mercy killing' to the mass slaughter of millions of human
beings deemed physically or racially 'inferior'...." Brief of Agudath Israel of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition at 3, Washington v. Glucksberg, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted sub nor. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (No. 96-110)
and Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (No. 95-1858).
We have witnessed too much history to disregard how easily a society may devalue
the lives of the 'unproductive.' The "'angel of mercy' can become the fanatic,
bringing the 'comfort' of death to some who do not clearly want it, then to others
who 'would be better off dead,' and finally, to classes of 'undesirable persons,' ....
In the current environment, it may well prove convenient-and all too easy-to
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There can be little doubt that "[t]he risks of killing people who
shouldn't be killed are great." '55 Thus, there is both a legal and moral
imperative to avoid the risk of needless death a regime of legal suicide
and a system of discriminatory healthcare delivery creates. The Court
should be at pains to avoid a decision which may be "fraught with seri-
ous consequences for the nation."1 56 The risks simply outweigh any
benefit that legalized suicide might achieve.'57 Americans need equita-
ble access to healthcare, not the right to suicide. Yet, "[i]t is one of the
great paradoxes of contemporary America that.., we... would rather
give patients the 'right to die' than medical care to help them live.' 58
Calls for suicide are symptoms of a failing system, not solutions.
STEPHANIE GRABOYES-Russo
move from recognition of an individual's 'right to die' to a climate enforcing a
'duty to die.'
Id. (quoting Mark Siegler & Alan J. Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and
Nutritional Support be Discontinued?, 145 ARCIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 130-31 (1985).
155. Oral Argument in Quill, supra note 1, at 27.
156. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
157. See Kasimar, Against Assisted Suicide, supra note 19, at 737.
158. Annas, supra note 19, at 897.
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